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If at First You Find the Truth, Try, Try
Again
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Under the guise of scientific inquiry and worker
safety, a taxpayer funded effort is helping corporate America avoid
legal responsibility for poisoning hundreds of thousands of Americans
with asbestos. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
has proposed a roadmap that purportedly seeks to minimize the potential
for asbestos disease.[1]
In fact, the roadmap and its vast melding of tax dollars, federal
bureaucracy, and industry cronies seek to protect asbestos defendants
from valid claims by mesothelioma victims by showing that chrysotile
asbestos is harmless, in contravention of almost one hundred years of
clinical research.
The only two significant remaining issues for asbestos
manufacturers after more than a century of wantonly poisoning millions—and
earning billions—are defending mesothelioma lawsuits and defeating a ban on
asbestos. The reasons are simple: asbestos lawsuits have bankrupted more
than 85 companies since 1976, with more sure to follow,[2]
and asbestos is still a profitable poison to sell in this country.[3]
These are not your grandfather’s bankruptcies, however,
where bankruptcy meant that the company got liquidated, laid off all its
employees, and wrecked the local economy.[4]
The asbestos bankruptcy sham isn’t really a bankruptcy at all. It’s a legal
sleight-of-hand that spins off the corporation’s legal liability by creating
a trust fund to “compensate” victims. The sick and dying victims are then
forced to hash it out with corporate lawyers, trust bureaucrats, and
insurance companies, while being deprived of getting justice via direct
lawsuits against the poisoner. The original mammoth bankrupt,
Johns-Manville, has emerged from faux bankruptcy and today enjoys over $2.5
billion in annual sales.[5]
An analysis of asbestos bankruptcies shows that the spin-off process has
made them stronger, leaner, and profitable.[6]
For the mesothelioma victims poisoned by these companies’ deliberate use of
asbestos, the outcome has been less rosy. Victims of Johns-Manville who
thought that they would be compensated soon found that the trust fund was
tottering on the brink of bankruptcy after a few short years—in the
old-fashioned sense, of course—so that they received only a pittance of the
pittance they’d originally been promised.[7]
Not-so-covert Operation
The NIOSH roadmap is a sharp arrow pointed squarely at
the heart of mesothelioma victims. Asbestos defendants know that there is no
asbestos litigation crisis. There is no logjam in the courts, courts are not
buckling under the weight of the asbestos caseload, and the peak of cases
has passed.[8]
Since faux-bankruptcies allow companies to quickly spin off their asbestos
liabilities, and since the only detailed review of asbestos litigation as it
relates to the supposed litigation crisis decisively concludes that there is
none,[9]
the only two issues left on the table are mesothelioma lawsuits and the
ability to keep peddling the poison for a profit.
Mesothelioma litigation is one of the only avenues to
the courthouse left for asbestos victims, and to get there the claimant
usually has to die, since mesothelioma has the poorest of prognoses. But
once in court, the victim has a good chance of getting some form of justice
in the few states that haven’t shut the courthouse door to asbestos victims.
Con Edison and Long Island Lighting Co. in New York got tagged with a $41
million verdict[10]
a few years back, and defendants live in terror of the eight-digit judgments
that outraged juries hand down in select jurisdictions.
When a patient with mesothelioma worked in the right
job and got exposed to asbestos from the right products, he has a great case
because the only cause of mesothelioma is asbestos. Unfortunately, the price
for his great case is typically a slow and painful death. Asbestos
manufacturers that have not yet sought faux-bankruptcy protection have
therefore made it their single biggest priority to prove that even though
asbestos indisputably causes mesothelioma, “their” type of asbestos does
not.
Enter NIOSH and the roadmap.
Truth or Consequence?
Science has been political since Galileo recanted to
the Inquisitors-General. But from the time the great astronomer retracted
his heliocentric ideas in 1633, the general trend has been to insist on
greater objectivity and less politics in science. Federal agencies like the
EPA and NIOSH have historically been regarded as purveyors of reasonably
de-politicized scientific inquiry. The Bush administration, however, has
fast-tracked governmental science right back to the 17th Century.
Industry has seized on a number of administration
initiatives as an indication that the time is ripe to churn out some
old-fashioned junk science on the issue of how much of what kind of asbestos
causes what kind of cancer how often in whom. The administration has favored
junk science initiatives that cover a wide range of health and science
related issues, and that have encouraged industry operatives with a wink and
a nod about the new direction of science in government.
With respect to global warming, the administration’s
strategy has been to question it at every turn.[11]
The core policy of the administration has been to increase fossil fuel
consumption while playing semantic games that exacerbate the problem,[12]
if there is a problem, which they deny. Even when the EPA endorsed the idea
that human activities such as oil refining, power plants, and automobile
emissions are important causes of global warming, Bush dismissed them as
“bureaucrats.”[13]
Stem cell research, another province of hard science, has met with great
resistance from the President. In 2001 he limited federal funding for
embryonic stem cell research to cell lines already in existence, but the
twenty lines still in use have become genetically degraded and are now
ill-suited for research.[14]
Bush’s non-scientific decision flew in the face of the National Institutes
of Health, who have concluded that research on human embryonic stem cells
offers great promise for curing Parkinson’s disease, heart disease,
Alzheimer’s disease, spinal cord injury, and diabetes.[15]
An equally blind and cynical eye was turned to mercury emissions,[16]
tobacco,[17]
air pollution,[18]
and science in general, as the President declared his ideas about
intelligent design on a scientific par with those of Charles Darwin by
insisting they be taught in the classroom.[19]
Asbestos industry operatives have been keenly watching the presidency for
cues as they ramp up their assault on well-established notions of the
asbestos toxicity in the waning days of the Bush Administration.
Silence of the Dead
Junk science and suppression of data are old friends to
the asbestos industry. Chronicling the lies and cover-ups by asbestos
defendants would occupy thousands of pages, and has been reviewed in depth
by Castleman,[20]
among others. Legal discovery in litigation has been responsible for
uncovering much of the hard proof that of wrongdoing by the asbestos
defendants. A brief recap, however, is appropriate because what is happening
in the 2007 NIOSH roadmap bears uncanny resemblance to what happened decades
ago.
In the 1920’s the medical community recognized that the
fibrotic lung condition later known as asbestosis was caused by, of all
things, exposure to asbestos.[21]
By 1933, hired gun scientist, physician, and public health expert Anthony
Lanza told asbestos company doctors that he didn’t think the hazards of
asbestos warranted warning labels or posters in view of the “extraordinary”
legal repercussions of telling the truth.[22]
The asbestos industry, with its lawyers, insurers, and hired scientists,
laid the foundation in the early 30’s for future concerted action to conceal
research findings about asbestos and cancer.[23]
In addition to doctoring scientific studies, publishing redacted science in
peer-reviewed journals, and having asbestos industry business managers
review and edit scientific research,[24]
the history of America’s worst public health disaster has been largely
caused by industry fraud.
Past behavior is always a useful referent for future
performance. As NIOSH embarks on its industry-approved roadmap, it is
helpful to remember that the strategy for asbestos companies has always
centered on delay. In 1950, asbestos corporate officials had already
committed to a firm policy of “epidemiology” and “causation,” the very two
issues still being “debated” more than half a century later. In recommending
an epidemiologic approach, the medical officer for Johns-Manville also
opined that, “We would be wise to wait until we have proof of no causal
relationship between asbestosis and pulmonary cancer…”[25]
It’s 2007, and the draft language from NIOSH’s roadmap
indicates that they’re still waiting: “Yet, as we enter the 21st
Century, many questions and areas of scientific uncertainty remain…Most
importantly, the Roadmap outlines a research program that will provide
answers to current scientific questions, reduce scientific uncertainties,
and provide a sound scientific foundation for future policy development.”[26]
Johns-Manville couldn’t have said it better.
Endless Doubt
Asbestos defendants have a simple strategy for defeating valid
mesothelioma claims in court: raise the level of uncertainty about science
in order to keep it from the jury. Judges have been reluctant to keep out
evidence where reasonable scientists disagree. So the asbestos defendants
have chosen to raise the level of uncertainty about science in order to
delay the use of knowledge about chrysotile toxicity for purposes of OSHA
decision-making, and to limit public awareness of an issue affecting public
or environmental health.
The backbone of the strategy to bring NIOSH to its knees vis-à-vis
asbestos science begins with the insidious Information Quality Act, the
brainchild of anti-regulation, pro-business lobbyist, trade council hack,
voyeur, and self-confessed “dirty old man” Jim Tozzi.[27]
The American Chamber of Commerce claimed that the law would “have a
revolutionary impact on the regulatory process.”[28]
Public interest groups claim that it has become a tool that special interest
groups can use to avoid regulation forever.[29]
Both have been proven correct.
With regard to asbestos science the jury is already
in—or out and not coming back, if you’re a mesothelioma victim—on whether
the act exists to promote quality data or exclude good science from agency
regulations. On August 19, 2003, the asbestos defense firm Morgan, Lewis and
Bockius[30]
filed a petition with the EPA challenging a 1986 publication, “Guidance for
Preventing Asbestos Disease among Auto Mechanics.”[31]
Morgan Lewis claimed that the publication, known as EPA’s Gold Book, flunked
the requirements of the Information Quality Act. Pursuant to the act, they
claimed the data was inadequate, inappropriate, outdated, and in conflict
with subsequent studies. Then they launched an all-out attack on the Gold
Book claiming that verification of the publications origins, preparations,
funding, review, and approval of the booklet are unknown.
Why all this fuss about an EPA publication that says in
plain language:
1. Asbestos disease should be prevented among auto
mechanics
2. Asbestos causes disease
3. No safe exposure levels are known
4. Asbestos is easy to breathe and ingest
5. Proper work practices will reduce exposure
The fuss, of course, is that the automotive industry is
terrified of mesothelioma lawsuits from auto mechanics. Brakes and clutches
contain chrysotile asbestos. If chrysotile is dangerous enough for the
government to warn, then the companies may ultimately be liable for their
failure to warn—especially since they knew of the danger. The only solution,
as they see it, is to prove that it’s not dangerous, or that the science is
so complex and uncertain that they couldn’t have known.
Morgan Lewis’s challenge framed the innocuous
publication as one intended to change the work-behavior practices of an
entire industry and, because it relied on information from scientific
sources, as one that must meet the rigorous standard for “influential
information.” The key admission as to what was really driving their concern
over the publication, however, was Morgan Lewis’s note that during
litigation the Gold Book is routinely proffered as evidence of EPA’s current
position and thinking on whether asbestos-containing friction products are
dangerous to users.[32]
Morgan Lewis cared zero about the quality of the data, and everything about
its admissibility in court.
EPA caved in, approving most of the petition and
promising to put out a new brochure, which it did.[33]
OSHA then took over, as it came to do the bidding of the asbestos defendants
and their lawyers. Unlike the Gold Book, which begins with the phrase
“preventing asbestos disease among auto mechanics,” OSHA’s new document
begins with a legal disclaimer: “[this bulletin] is not a standard or
regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations.” The Gold Book talks
about latency, asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer—evils caused by
asbestos beyond any shred of scientific doubt, and the book instructs “there
is no known level of exposure to asbestos below which health effects do not
occur.” In contrast, OSHA’s 2006 bulletin includes exactly 27 words about
health effects of asbestos. The document assures readers that asbestos use
is declining, that newer cars may not use such products, and that nothing in
the bulletin is to be taken as a standard, requirement, or regulation. It’s
more like free advice, worth pretty much what it costs.
And what about the scientific quality of the
government’s new booklet under the Information Quality Act? The original
Gold Book was documented with 37 footnotes. The new OSHA brochure? One.
Tilting the Panel
The NIOSH draft roadmap, developed with the help of
NIOSH scientists and engineers with combined experience in toxicology,
epidemiology, industrial hygiene, analytical chemistry, and other
disciplines, is forty-seven pages long. It includes a glossary, extensive
footnotes, graphs, and even a list of acronyms. But nowhere in the document
does it provide the long list of names of the scientists, engineers, and
others who supposedly developed the report.
Nor is this a harmless oversight. The roadmap’s peer
review panel is carefully composed of three unabashed “chrysotile doesn’t
cause meso” members, one asbestos victim advocate, and five members who have
expertise in various areas. None is an advocate for the proven scientific
proposition that chrysotile causes mesothelioma. Ann G. Wylie, mineralogist
at the University of Maryland, most recently worked as the principal
investigator for a $508,000 grant funded by GM, Chrysler-Daimler, and Ford,[34]
in case anyone’s wondering where she stands on chrysotile asbestos as it
relates to automotive brakes. Wylie also is an unabashed proponent of the
idea that exposure limits need to be revised via reclassification of
asbestos fibers[35]—and
she’s not suggesting downward, either. This reclassification—or research, as
it’s called in the roadmap—is precisely what NIOSH has been tasked by
industry to do: allow lots of exposure to chrysotile.
Brooke Mossman from the University of Vermont is
another rabid asbestos apologist on the peer review panel. In addition to a
Scientific American article where she reminds readers that chrysotile is
“safer” than other forms of asbestos, and that other countries find asbestos
of great utility,[36]
Mossman defends one of her papers by quoting an epidemiologist who suggests
that chrysotile may not cause mesothelioma at all.[37]
The real aim of the roadmap is to find a path out of the last century of
medical research, and find a way back to the days when Dr. Lanza could
authoritatively tell fellow physicians that there really was no need for
warnings about asbestos. Unlike Lanza, who was at least honest enough to
admit that the reason for suppressing scientific facts was fear of
litigation, the new crop of NIOSH hacks are hell-bent on simply denying the
science.
In case the panel’s hue in terms of chrysotile toxicity
weren’t sufficiently in favor of asbestos defendants, Morton Lippman also
came along for the ride. Lippman believes that any fiber less than 5µ
(happens to include most chrysotile fibers) is harmless. When the Carpenter
Report clearly explained that even though short fibers might be less
carcinogenic than long fibers, the fact that short fibers greatly
outnumbered long fibers in Lower Manhattan after 9/11 and thus might cause
more disease than long ones, Lippman accused Carpenter of “fear-mongering”
in raising the short fiber issue.[38]
Since the NIOSH roadmap covers an extraordinary
scope—“a research program that will provide answers to the current
scientific questions, reduce scientific uncertainties, and provide a sound
scientific foundation for future policy development”—it is remarkable that
three pure pro-chrysotile reviewers would be on the peer review panel of
only nine people, unless of course the real purpose of the roadmap was not
to provide answers to current scientific questions but to chart a course for
GM, Ford, and Chrysler-Daimler so that they may continue using chrysotile in
their brakes and clutches, while helping chrysotile defendants avoid
liability in court.
So How Dangerous IS Chrysotile?
Given the 3,000-4,000 Americans who die every year from
mesothelioma, and have been doing so for decades, that the question is being
asked at all is an offense against humanity. While asbestos defendants in
this country dredge up the old arguments about the harmlessness of
chrysotile, the rest of the world is working overtime to ban it. As of 2007,
chrysotile has been banned by Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Germany, Kuwait, France, Poland, Monaco,
Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil,
Latvia, Chile, Argentina, Spain, Luxembourg, Uruguay, Australia, Honduras,
South Africa, Japan, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary,
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia, Egypt, Jordan, Croatia, New
Caledonia, Gabon, and the Seychelles.[39]
What do they know that we don’t? Nothing.
The World Health Organization classifies chrysotile as
a carcinogen, period.[40]
The International Agency for Research on Cancer is emphatic that it is not
possible to assess whether there is an exposure level below which an
increased risk of cancer will not occur.[41]
The IARC classifies chrysotile as a carcinogen, and clearly states that
although other types of asbestos create a higher risk for mesothelioma, some
cases of mesothelioma do occur as a result of exposure to chrysotile.[42]
While asbestos defendants gleefully seize on the fact
that chrysotile isn’t the most potent cause of mesothelioma, they forget
that OSHA and EPA’s mandates aren’t only to ban the most potent causes of
mesothelioma, but to make the workplace safer. Chrysotile is a carcinogen,
case closed. From an occupational safety regulatory standpoint, what
difference does it make to NIOSH whether mechanics are more likely to get
mesothelioma or lung cancer? The substance is clearly dangerous, so get rid
of it.
The answer, of course, is that the NIOSH roadmap is not
set up to get asbestos carcinogens out of the workplace—everyone, even its
most rabid apologists, agrees that chrysotile is a carcinogen. The NIOSH
roadmap is, rather, set up to prove that chrysotile doesn’t cause
mesothelioma. A greater perversion of a workplace safety research institute
could hardly be imagined.
However at odds with public health or occupational
safety, the real NIOSH inquiry is “Does this otherwise lethal carcinogen
also cause mesothelioma?” The answer is also “yes.” A 25-year longitudinal
study in China conducted by Chinese, Japanese, and American researchers
showed that chrysotile alone causes mesothelioma.
[43] This debunks the industry claim that only non-chrysotile
forms of asbestos are to blame, and it confirms what doctors have been
seeing for a century: even if chrysotile is less deadly, when the
concentrations are high enough it causes lots and lots of mesothelioma.
NIOSH’s mandate is to protect workers. Abating asbestos
and strictly enforcing dust suppression laws saves lives. Supporting the Ban
Asbestos Act and putting teeth into workplace safety regulations fit neatly
with OSHA’s mission. Empanelling junk scientists and churning out draft
roadmaps fit the mission of asbestos defendants seeking a silver bullet to
slay products liability litigation and to let them continue hawking their
deadly wares.
Can We Please Go Home?
There is no compelling scientific, regulatory, medical,
or policy reason to invest public money in an effort to establish that
chrysotile doesn’t cause mesothelioma. Such research seeks to exculpate the
fiber types that were used in 95% of all commercial and industrial
applications, usage levels that fit neatly with the thousands of
mesothelioma deaths every year in this country, and fit even more neatly
with the Chinese study that shows how more exposure will lead to more
mesothelioma.
No research will ever exculpate asbestos defendants’
products as pure chrysotile, because reasonable scientists differ over
whether pure chrysotile even exists.[44]
In addition, most of the asbestos used through the 1970’s, which is the
source of the current mesothelioma scourge, was contaminated with amphibole/tremolite
fibers. Sixty years ago asbestos manufacturers tried to escape blame for the
public health crisis by pointing the finger at South African blue asbestos.
Now they're doing it again, except this time it’s with taxpayer dollars and
the weight of a federal agency.
NIOSH should stop wasting resources on its sham
roadmap. NIOSH should start investing money in finding a cure for
mesothelioma. NIOSH should use its resources to come up with scientific
findings that will help OSHA make the workplace safer by banning asbestos
products. It really is that simple.
[1]
Middendorf, Paul, Ralph Zumwalde, and Robert Castellan, “Asbestos
and other mineral fibers: a roadmap for scientific research,” by on
behalf of the NIOSH Mineral Fibers Work Group, Feb. 2007
[3]
Virta, Robert L., Asbestos: Geology, Mineralogy, Mining, and Uses,
U.S. Geological Survey, 2002,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2002/of02-149/of02-149.pdf. “In the
U.S., the major use in roofing compounds (62%), followed by gaskets
(22%) and friction products (11%).
[4]
Mayerson, Marc, InsuranceScrawl.com, Mar. 2006. The first step in an
asbestos-driven bankruptcy is to take the asbestos claims stream and
estimate its value. The debtor then needs to satisfy that creditor
claim in the bankruptcy, which it does by setting up a trust and
funding it with cash (from itself and sometimes its corporate
parent), stock, and preexisting insurance rights. The debtor
receives a channeling injunction that bars the assertion of any
asbestos-related claim against itself (and sometimes against
non-debtors, see Susan Power Johnston and Katherine Porter,
Extension of Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code to Nondebtor
Parents, Affiliates, and Transaction Parties, 59 Business Lawyer
511-12 (2004)), and the injunction furthermore funnels all claims to
the trust. In other words, the debtor is able to emerge from
bankruptcy shorn of its asbestos liabilities without fear of any
future claims. The trust in turn is charged with resolving the
asbestos claims and sets up an administrative compensation process,
usually with relaxed standards of proof, to “adjudicate” the tort
claims. The claimant may have the right further to bring an action
in court, though with no ability to seek punitive damages for
example. This is the model that was used in the Manville bankruptcy
and was confirmed, expanded, and modified by Congress in 1994 when
the bankruptcy code was amended with the addition of section 524(g),
11 U.S.C. § 524(g), a provision specially designed to deal with
asbestos-driven bankruptcies. While certain procedural and
substantive changes were implemented in 524(g), from the debtor’s
perspective one key was that 524(g) made clear that future claims,
claims by persons exposed to asbestos but who at the time of the
bankruptcy filing had no legal claim, would have their claims
channeled to the trust as well. Dealing with “futures” has been the
Achilles heel of several non-bankruptcy deals in the class-action
context, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), so the express conferral of power on
bankruptcy courts to limit the right to sue of future claimants was
quite significant. [Insurance Scrawl was profiled in The Wall Street
Journal’s “Guide to the Blogs Insiders Read to Stay Current.”
(11/16/05), and described as “influential” and a “must read,” for
keeping “editorializing to a minimum,” while providing analysis with
“weight” that “dissect[s]” court opinions and addresses the
“nuances.”]
[5]
SEIDA annual report, 2005,
http://www.seida.info/downloads/2005AnnualReport.pdf
[6]
Benston, George J., Professor, “Financial Analysis of Companies that
Filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2000 and 2001 as a Result of
Asbestos Obligations,” Oct. 2003,
http://www.ewg.org/reports/asbestos/facts/fact2.php
[7]
Zirin, James D., of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Dow Jones Company,
2001. To date, after some more judicial intervention, the trust has
settled with an additional 55,000 claimants and paid a total of $2
billion to victims of asbestos exposure, mostly on a basis of 10
cents on the dollar.
[8]
“Asbestos Cases in the Courts: No Logjam,” Public Citizen, Feb.
2006, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NoLogJam.pdf
[9]
“Asbestos Cases in the Courts: No Logjam,” Public Citizen, Feb.
2006, http://www.citizen.org/documents/NoLogJam.pdf
[10]
Croteau v. Consolidated Edison, No. 118793/01 (New York Co.,
N.Y., Sup. Ct.)
[11]
The Guardian, April 4, 2004
[12]
Mieszkowski, K., “Bush: Global warming is just hot air,” Salon, Sep.
10, 2004. “The core of the Bush policy was a voluntary goal of
reducing emissions ‘intensity’ by 18 percent by 2012,” says Aimee
Christensen, executive director of Environment 2004, a political
action group. So what the policy really calls for—but does not
require—is a mere 4 percent reduction in intensity. What’s lost in
the discussion about “emissions intensity” says Christensen, is that
actual greenhouse gas emissions will increase 12 percent. Compare
that to the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, which would have
mandated that by 2012 the U.S. return to emission levels 7 percent
below those of 1990, or the McCain/Lieberman Climate Stewardship
Act, which asked that the U.S. return to year 2000 levels of
emissions. Both those plans would result in actual reductions, not
just intensity reductions. The Bush administration walked away from
the first proposal on the international stage and opposed the second
here at home.
[13]
CBS/AP News, June 4, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/03/tech/main510920.shtml
[14]
Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2007
[15]
NIH, Stem Cells: Scientific Progress and Future Research Directions
(June 2001)
[16]
Committee policy hearing on administration’s proposed mercury
emissions rules, July 9, 2004. “Vermont’s U.S. Senators Patrick
Leahy and Jim Jeffords Friday led a hearing to examine the Bush
Administration’s proposal on mercury emissions from power
plants. The nation's 1,100 coal-burning power plants emit about 48
tons of mercury each year, the largest unregulated U.S.
source. Witnesses, including former Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) officials, testified that the Administration proposal allows
for more mercury pollution than current law and is much less
protective of public health. Jeffords, the ranking member of the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee said, “Sadly, the Bush
Administration’s proposal on mercury pollution from power plants
appears to do little to protect public health, especially in the
short term. The proposed Administration rule calls for a permanent
delay in serious reductions and would achieve far less in cleanup
than is possible with today’s technologies and is required by the
Clean Air Act. Also, it lets more than 200 power plants buy their
way out of controlling these toxic emissions for 20 years or more.” http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200407/070904.html
[17]
Washington Post, Mar. 22, 2007. The leader of the Justice Department
team that prosecuted a landmark lawsuit against tobacco companies
said yesterday that Bush administration political appointees
repeatedly ordered her to take steps that weakened the government's
racketeering case. Sharon Y. Eubanks said Bush loyalists in Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales's office began micromanaging the team's
strategy in the final weeks of the 2005 trial, to the detriment of
the government's claim that the industry had conspired to lie to
U.S. smokers.
[18]
President George W. Bush, April 20, 2007,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/environment/. “By encouraging
cooperative conservation, innovation, and new technologies, my
Administration has compiled a strong environmental record. This
Earth Day, harmful air pollutant levels are down more than ten
percent since 2001. Millions more Americans are drinking cleaner,
safer water. We have removed hazardous fuels from more than 19
million acres of federal land. We have created, restored, or
protected more than 2.5 million acres of wetlands, and we have
conserved almost 200 million of acres of habitat through Farm Bill
conservation programs. And we are taking positive steps to confront
the important challenge of climate change. Our work is not done. We
also have a responsibility to pass on to future generations our
commitment to the environment.” Contrast this with an analysis of
the Clear Skies plan that shows it will weaken and delay health
protections already required under the law, set weaker targets for
emissions of sulfur dioxide, mercury, and nitrogen oxides from U.S.
power plants, fail to include a single measure to reduce or even
limit the growth of carbon dioxide, and hamstring efforts to cut
pollution from old coal-fired plants. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Sep. 4, 2003,
http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/qbushplan.asp.
[19]
Washington Post, Aug. 3, 2005. President Bush invigorated proponents
of teaching alternatives to evolution in public schools with remarks
saying that schoolchildren should be taught about “intelligent
design,” a view of creation that challenges established scientific
thinking and promotes the idea that an unseen force is behind the
development of humanity.
[20]
Castleman, B., “Asbestos: Medical and legal aspects,” 1986
[21]
“The Silence: The Asbestos Industry and Early Occupational Cancer
Research—A Case Study,” Lilienfeld, David, M.D., American Journal of
Public Health, 1991, Vol. 81, No. 6
[26]
Asbestos and Other Mineral Fibers: A Roadmap for Scientific
Research, NIOSH, Feb. 2007
[27]
Washington Monthly, May 2004. Tozzi's Information Quality Act,
codified at 44 U.S.C. 3504(d)(1) and 3516, has led to suits
challenging a government report on climate change and a National
Institutes of Health study on diet, both of which represent
state-of-the-art scientific work in their fields. The latter suit
was recently filed by the Chamber of Commerce and the Salt
Institute, an industry group, as a strategic test case to establish
judicial review under the Data Quality Act. Slowly, Tozzi and allies
are laying the groundwork for a broader assault on the regulatory
state. Data quality, says Kovacs, is going to have “a revolutionary
impact on the regulatory process.”
[28]
The Information Quality Act: OMB’s Guidance and Initial
Implementation, Congressional Research Service, Sep. 17, 2004.
[30]
Information Quality Act petition, Aug. 19, 2003
[31]
EPA publication, June 1986
[32]
Information Quality Act petition, id.
[33]
Asbestos—Automotive Brake and Clutch Repair Work, OSHA, Jul. 26,
2006, http://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib072606.html#1
[34]
Ann G. Wylie curriculum vitae
[35]
Wylie, A., The Importance of Width in Asbestos Fiber Carcinogenicity
and its Implications for Public Policy, American Industrial Hygiene
Association journal, Jun. 1993. “Evidence from human epidemiology,
experimental animal implantation and inoculation studies, and lung
burden studies shows that fibers with widths greater than 1 µm are
not implicated in the occurrence of lung cancer or mesothelioma.
Furthermore, it is generally believed that certain fibers thinner
than a few tenths of a micrometer must be abundant in a fiber
population in order for them to be a causative agent for
mesothelioma. These conclusions are fully consistent with the
mineralogical characteristics of asbestos fibers, which, as fibrils,
have widths of less than 1 µm and, as bundles, easily dissagregate
into fibrils. Furthermore, the biological behavior of various habits
of tremolite shows a clear dose-response relationship and provides
evidence for a threshold between fiber width and tumor experience in
animals. Public policy in regulating mineral fibers should
incorporate this knowledge by altering the existing federal asbestos
fiber definitions to reflect it.”
[36]
“Asbestos Revisited,” Scientific American, July 1997
[38]
NYCOSH Update on Safety and Health, Vol. VIII, No. 22, March 16,
2005
[39]
International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, 2006
[40]
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), 1998, Summaries
& Evaluations: ASBESTOS
(Actinolite, amosite, anthophyllite, chrysotile, crocidolite,
tremolite), (Group 1)
[41]
IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans,
Vol. 14, Asbestos,
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol14/volume14.pdf
[42]
IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans,
Vol. 2, Some Inorganic and Organometallic Compounds,
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol2/volume2.pdf
[43]
Cancer Mortality among Workers Exposed to Amphibole-free Chrysotile
Asbestos, American Journal of Epidemiology Vol. 154, No. 6 :
538-543, 2001. The issue of whether exposure to chrysotile asbestos
alone, without contamination from amphibole asbestos,
causes lung cancer and mesothelioma was investigated in a
25-year longitudinal study (1972–1996) in Chongqin,
China. The study cohort comprised 515 male asbestos plant
workers exposed to chrysotile only; the control cohort
included 650 non-dust-exposed workers. The results of
analysis in which the proportional hazards model was used
indicated that mortality due to all causes, all cancers,
and lung cancer was related to asbestos exposure; the relative
risks, adjusted for age and smoking, were 2.9, 4.3, and 6.6,
respectively. Fiber concentrations in the raw material section
and the textile section of the plant were 7.6 and 4.5
fibers/ml, respectively. Because of differences between
the study and control plants, the authors also compared
various sections of the asbestos plant that had different
levels of dust exposure. The adjusted relative risk of
lung cancer was 8.1 for workers exposed to high versus
low levels of asbestos. Two cases of malignant mesothelioma,
one pleural and the other peritoneal, were found in the
asbestos cohort. These results suggest that heavy
exposure to pure chrysotile asbestos alone, with
negligible amphibole contamination, can cause lung cancer
and malignant mesothelioma in exposed workers.
[44]
Analysis of Amphibole Asbestos in Chrysotile and Other Minerals,
Addison, J., and L.S.T. Davies, Annals of Occupational Hygiene, Vol.
34, No. 2, pp. 159-175, 1990. Chrysotile asbestos and many other
mineral raw materials contain amphibole minerals which
may be asbestiform. There is currently no analytical
method which will detect the presence of amphibole at
sufficiently low limits to preclude the possibility of inadvertent
exposure of persons handling these materials to hazardous
airborne fiber concentrations. A method of chemical
digestion of chrysotiles has been tested with regard to
the determination of their tremolite contaminant content
and this has been applied to a range of chrysotile and
other minerals. The method improves the sensitivity of the amphibole
analysis at least 10-fold giving detection limits of
0.01–0.05% in chrysotile by X-ray diffractometry (XRD).
The difficulties arising from compositional and morphological
variations are discussed in the context of the potential
hazards from airborne fibers and the relative values of
analyses by XRD, infra red spectrophotometry (IR) and
electron microscopy. It is concluded that XRD and IR are useful as
screening methods for the detection of amphibole in
chrysotile but other materials should be analyzed by
optical or electron microscopy.
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